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RELIGION, FEMINISM AND ABORTION: THE 
REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IN TWO 
CATHOLIC COUNTRIES 
Richard F. Storrow* 
Perspectives on abortion and religious values have been two primary 
influences on the development of the various regulatory regimes that govern 
                                                                                                                               
* Professor of Law, City University of New York. J.D., Columbia, 1993; M.A., 
Columbia, 1989; B.A., Miami University, 1987. Many thanks to the United States State 
Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Comisión Fulbright in Spain 
for their generous research support under the auspices of the J. William Fulbright Scholarship 
Program. Many thanks to the Department of Civil Law, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, 
for hosting me so graciously during my time in Spain. I am indebted to my friends and 
colleagues at Pompeu Fabra, especially Josep Ferrer Riba, Esther Farnós Amorós, Mireia 
Artigot Golobardes, Antoni Rubí Puig, Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, Josep Sandiumenge Farré, 
Albert Azagra Malo, Margarida Garriga Gorina, Albert Lamarca Marquès, Pau Salvador 
Coderch, Fernando Gómez Pomar, Joan Egea Fernández, Laura Alascio Carrasco, Rosa Milà 
Rafel, Laura Allueva Aznar, Ariadna Aguilera Rull, Marian Gili Saldaña and Magalí Riera 
Roca. 
This study benefited immensely from the interviews I conducted with six individuals 
each of whom has had some measure of involvement in developing the Spanish law of 
assisted reproduction. Marcelo Palacios, President and Founder of the International Society of 
Bioethics, is the physician and former member of the Spanish Parliament who was in charge 
of developing and drafting the 1988 law. Pedro Barri, director of  the Department of 
Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproduction at USP Institut Universitari Dexeus, and Anna 
Veiga, director of the Stem Cell Bank at the Center of Regenerative Medicine of Barcelona 
and Chairman of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology, are 
physicians who oversaw the birth of the first IVF baby in Spain in 1984. Roberto Matorras, 
former President of the Spanish Fertility Society, heads the Human Reproduction Unit at the 
Hospital de Cruces, where the birth of the first IVF baby in the Spanish public health system 
took place in 1985. Jaime Vidal is a professor of law at the University of Valencia who has 
been writing on the implications of Spanish law for new reproductive technologies since the 
advent of IVF. Carlos Romeo directs the Interuniversity Chair in Law and the Human Genome 
at the University of Deusto and has been involved at several stages of the development of 
various bioethics laws in Spain.  
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assisted reproduction around the world. This paper examines why two 
countries with similar histories of allegiance to Roman Catholicism have 
developed highly divergent legal regimes to regulate assisted reproduction. 
Italy has enacted one of the most restrictive regimes known, Spain one of the 
most permissive. The comparative analysis employed here will afford insight 
into how the development of legislative responses to assisted reproduction 
correlate with religious commitments, feminist sentiment and the regulation 
of abortion.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Looking back on early work in the regulation of assisted reproductive 
technology (ART), one is struck by how far our reactions to reproductive 
technology have come since the decades leading up to the birth of the first in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) baby in 1978. No longer does IVF provoke the 
“futuristic fantasies and . . . doom-laden scenarios”1 that populate the textual 
representations of reproductive technology of the 1920s and 1930s. In that 
long-ago era when most reproductive technology remained in the realm of 
speculation, there was plenty of hope that reproductive technology would be 
liberatory. At the same time, these flights of fancy fueled anxiety about what 
scientific intervention into human reproduction would mean for the future.2 
                                                                                                                               
1. MARILYN STRATHERN, REPRODUCING THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON ANTHROPOLOGY, 
KINSHIP, AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 5 (1992). 
2. SUSAN MERRILL SQUIER, BABIES IN BOTTLES: TWENTIETH-CENTURY VISIONS OF 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 2–4 (1994); see also ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG, PANDORA’S BABY: 
HOW THE FIRST TEST TUBE BABIES SPARKED THE REPRODUCTIVE REVOLUTION 15 (2004) (“[I]n 
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That future is now, and through contemporary eyes looks comparatively 
bland: “IVF is no longer monstrous; today it is almost mundane.”3 This was 
not the case in the wake of the birth of Louise Brown, however, as European 
governments grappled with the possibility that assisted reproduction would 
have to be curbed, or at the very least subjected to strict guidelines, lest 
unregulated scientific experimentation in the realm of human reproduction 
collide with important societal interests and fan the flames of collective fear 
and panic.   
It is well understood that the task of drafting laws to govern assisted 
reproduction places lawmakers in the unenviable position of attempting to 
strike a balance between the individual right to procreate and majoritarian 
convictions relating to responsible reproductive practices and parenting. 
European legislatures have placed several considerations in the balance, 
including the status of the embryo, the best interests of the child, 
reproductive autonomy, and the exploitation of women by technology. A 
legislature’s views on these issues tend to influence the relative 
permissiveness or restrictiveness of the resulting law. Some countries prize a 
genetic connection in parent-child relationships so highly that only 
techniques that employ the intending parents’ gametes are permitted. This 
narrow view of what constitutes a healthy family life results in tight controls 
on access to assisted reproduction. Countries with a less constrained view of 
the possibilities for organizing family life believe strong commitments to 
both individual autonomy and child welfare are compatible. Under this view, 
access to assisted reproduction is not limited to heterosexual couples but may 
extend to gay and lesbian couples and single individuals. 
In addition to the impact family formation policies have on the welfare 
of children, beliefs about the status of the embryo are often raised in defense 
of or in opposition to the different ways ART might be regulated. The belief 
that embryos are human beings is most closely associated with restrictions on 
assisted reproduction, whether in the form of an outright ban on IVF, as in 
Costa Rica,4 or, as in Italy, a mandate that no embryo be subjected to pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis, donated to science, or destroyed. A belief 
                                                                                                                               
the years before the first test tube baby . . . reasonable men and women . . . sincerely believed 
that IVF might unleash a scourge of woeful possibilities . . . .”); Bernard Rubin, Psychological 
Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 13 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 121 (1965).   
3. HENIG, supra note 2, at 233.   
4. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has determined that the ban 
violates the American Convention on Human Rights and has submitted the matter to the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights. http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.361Eng.pdf (July 
29, 2011). 
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that embryos are not due quite so much respect tends to vest decision-making 
control in the intending parents, whether they are using their own gametes in 
the process or have procured the gametes of third parties.  
These issues were foremost in the minds of the drafters of the earliest 
legislative regimes governing assisted reproduction in Europe, where today 
we find a dizzying patchwork of differing laws. Within this patchwork, Italy 
and Spain, both countries with similar histories of allegiance to the Roman 
Catholic Church, stand out—Italy for its restrictive stance and Spain for its 
permissiveness. Ethicists react with equal alarm to restrictiveness and 
permissiveness, but there has been widespread attention paid only to the 
restrictive law Italy enacted in 2004.5 The Spanish approach to regulation6 
has either been ignored,7 oversimplified,8 or subjected to cursory analysis.9 
Notable, if not numerous, exceptions to these general trends do exist,10 but 
the trend itself is unfortunate primarily because there is in Spain a rich 
literature and an ongoing dialogue on bioethical issues generally and on 
assisted reproduction in particular.11 This literature is not very well known 
outside of Spain, however. In a recent issue of Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics, Cornell University Professor of Medical Ethics Pablo 
Rodríguez del Pozo commented: “The dissemination of ideas from the 
Spanish-speaking world has been nearly invisible to the English-speaking 
world of bioethics, isolated by language and culture from intellectual 
                                                                                                                               
5. Legge 19 febbraio 2004, n.40, in G.U. 24 febbraio 2004, n.45 (It.), available at 
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/04040l.htm. 
6. Sobre Técnicas de Reproducción Humana Asistida (B.O.E. 2006, 9292), available 
at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2006/05/27/pdfs/A19947-19956.pdf. 
7. E.g., THIRD PARTY ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACROSS CULTURES: SOCIAL, LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Eric Blyth & Ruth Landau eds., 2004). 
8. E.g., Antonio Pellicer, The Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction: A View from 
Spain, 11 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 660 (2005). 
9. E.g., Jaime Vidal Martínez, The Legal Situation of Assisted Reproduction in Spain, 
in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED PROCREATION 287 
(Donald Evans ed., 1996). 
10. E.g., Julien Dubouchet & Ulrich Klöti, ART in Spain: Technocratic Inheritance and 
Modernist Aspirations, in COMPARATIVE BIOMEDICAL POLICY: GOVERNING ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (Ivar Bleiklie et al. eds., 2004); José-Javier Hualde-Sanchez & 
Itziar Alkorta Idiaquez, Génétique et procréations assistées en Espagne, in BIOMEDICINE, THE 
FAMILY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 221 (Marie-Thérèse Meulders-Klein et al. eds., 2002). 
11. In this connection, consider activities of the Interuniversity Network on Law and the 
Human Genome at the University of Deusto, available at http://www.catedraderechoygenoma 
humano.es/revista_consejo.asp, and the UNESCO-sponsored Bioethics and Law Observatory 
at the University of Barcelona, http://www.pcb.ub.es/bioeticaidret/index.php?lang=es_ES.  
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currents abroad.”12 In some measure, then, this study seeks to remedy this 
isolation by bringing Spanish perspectives into the English-language 
discussion of biomedical regulation.  
Scholarship on the regulation of assisted reproduction tends to be 
country-specific. It does not, in most cases, make connections between 
countries with alternative approaches to regulation. Exceptions do exist,13 but 
even studies that purport to be comparative often simply present highly 
detailed and discrete descriptions of each jurisdiction’s legislative regime. 
They may even develop a taxonomy for categorizing the different degrees of 
regulation14 but nonetheless leave common themes and explanations of these 
differences unexplored. What is most notable is that these studies often lack 
any description of the legislative process that led to the legislation in 
question. This “ocean of country-specific details that usually characterizes 
cross-national empirical studies”15 is nonetheless a helpful point of departure 
for embarking on policy analysis in a more comparative vein. The bioethics 
literature on assisted reproduction is a useful complement to the country-
specific studies, approaching the topic as it does through the lens of universal 
philosophical principles. Its major shortcoming, though, from the point of 
view of comparative policy analysis, is its lack of engagement with theories 
of legislation and the realities of the political process. In other words, 
bioethics seems often to ignore that what seems normatively correct may not 
be politically achievable. In an attempt to address the gap in comparative 
policy analysis on the regulation of ART, this article focuses on the 
legislative processes that have led to statutory enactments on assisted 
reproduction in two historically Catholic countries. This approach to the 
question of regulation will help elucidate the influence of physicians, the 
Roman Catholic Church, the feminist movement and the issue of abortion on 
the regulations that were ultimately enacted in Italy and Spain and how those 
influences might manifest themselves in debates over legislation that may 
one day be considered in the United States.  
                                                                                                                               
12. Pablo Rodriguez Del Pozo & Joseph J. Fins, Guest Editorial: The Many Voices of 
Spanish Bioethics – An Introduction, 18 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 214, 214 
(2009).  
13. E.g., Bill Atkin, Regulation of Assisted Human Reproduction: The Recent New 
Zealand Model in Comparison with Other Systems, 11 REVUE JURIDIQUE POLYNÉSIENNE 81 
(2005). 
14. E.g., Linda Nielsen, Legal Consensus and Divergence in Europe in the Area of 
Assisted Conception—Room for Harmonisation?, in CREATING THE CHILD, supra note 9, at 
305, 306. 
15. Jan W. van Deth, Series Editor’s Preface, in COMPARATIVE BIOMEDICAL POLICY, 
supra note 10, at xiii.  
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II.  THERAPEUTIC CULTURES AND BIOMEDICAL REGULATION IN EUROPE 
In contrast to the majority of countries,16 all countries in Europe have 
comprehensive legislative schemes governing assisted reproduction. The 
prevalence of legislation in this part of the world may be due to the 
prevailing sentiment that it is inconceivable in Europe that the public would 
not insist on regulation of something as monumental as the new reproductive 
technologies.17  
But the question of regulating in this area did not simply arise with the 
birth of the first child conceived using IVF. It had already been proceeding 
with regard to alternative insemination for some time. By the 1960s, 
alternative insemination had become relatively familiar.18 From the mid-
1970s and into the early 1980s, judicial decisions and, later, legislation began 
to appear regarding the legality of,19 the legal requirements for,20 and the 
legal ramifications of alternative insemination.21  
                                                                                                                               
16. According to the International Federation of Fertility Societies’ most recent 
Surveillance, assisted reproduction is governed by legislation in approximately 40 % of the 
countries surveyed.  Howard W. Jones, Ian Cooke et al., Surveillance 2010 (2011), INT’L 
FED’N FERTILITY SOCIETIES, http://www.iffs-reproduction.org/documents/IFFS_Surveillance 
_2010.pdf, at 10. 
17. Jacinto Gil Rodriguez, Prologue, ITZIAR ALKORTA IDIAKEZ, REGULACIÓN JURÍDICA 
DE LA MEDICINA REPRODUCTIVA: DERECHO ESPAÑOL Y COMPARADO 19 (2003) (describing this 
insistence as “la compulsa del necesario control público de los nuevos métodos de 
procreación, habida cuenta de la necesario conjugación entre las elecciones individuales, la 
garantía científica y la trascendencia social de las singulares biotecnologías que, en cada caso, 
pretenden activarse.”).  
18. Charles P. Kindregan Jr., Thinking About the Law of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 27 WIS. J. FAM. L. 123 (2007). 
19. 360 Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 175, 
175 (1983) (noting that French Minister of Justice declares artificial insemination not legally 
prohibited). 
20. Legitimacy of Children, 1977 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 53 (1977) (noting that 
Yugoslavia bars payment to sperm donors); Fertility Regulation: Sterilization, 1978 ANN. 
REV. POPULATION L. 12 (1978); Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 9 ANN. REV. 
POPULATION L. 155–57 (1982) (explaining comprehensive regulations promulgated in 
Czechoslovakia); 360 Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION 
L. 158 (1982) (explaining Hungarian Ministry of Health ordinance and obstetrics, 
gynaecology and urology societies’ circular governing “the selection and examination of 
donors and recipients for artificial insemination”); Other Laws Affecting Parents and 
Children, 11 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 133 (1984) (citing Sweden’s Insemination Act).  
21. Filiation: Legitimacy of Children, 1976 ANN. REV. POPULATION L.105–06 (1976) 
(explaining that a French court ruled husband could renounce his paternity even if he had 
consented to his wife’s medical insemination by donor); Filiation of Children, 1980 ANN. 
REV. POPULATION L. 168 (1980) (noting the law in Yugoslavia); Other Laws Affecting Parents 
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After the birth of Louise Brown in the United Kingdom in 1978, 
various European groups and the governments of Victoria and Queensland, 
Australia, began studying what social repercussions the use of assisted 
reproductive techniques might have.22 That same year, India became the 
second country to have a successful IVF birth,23 followed by Australia in 
1980.24 Australia built upon this success with, all in 1984, the world’s first 
IVF quadruplets, the first IVF birth using a donor egg, the first IVF birth 
using a donor embryo, and the first IVF birth using a frozen embryo. In 
1986, the first IVF birth using a frozen egg occurred in Adelaide.25 As of 
                                                                                                                               
and Children, 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 154–55 (1982) (noting the law in Czechoslovakia); 
Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 11 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 134 (1984) (noting 
the law in Sweden); M. Mandofia & M. Buergisser, Les Difficultés de Réglementer la 
Procréation Assistée, 13 DÉVIANCE ET SOCIÉTÉ 257, 258 (1989). Such laws coincided with the 
enactment of such laws in the individual U.S. states and the Canadian provinces. Legitimacy 
of Children, 1976 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 114–16 (1976) (noting the law in Connecticut); 
Rights of Spouses Within Marriage, 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 95 (1982) (noting the law in 
Quebec). Legitimacy of Birth: Filiation of Children, 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 152 (1982) 
(noting a South African court determines child born via artificial insemination to be 
illegitimate); Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 175–
76 (1983) (noting a German court determined husband within certain period of time after birth 
could challenge legitimacy of child born to his wife via AID and with his consent); K., 
Stoyanovich, Adultery: La Légitimité des Enfants Nés par Suite de L’Insemination Artificielle, 
en France et aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique, 8 REVUE INERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 264, 
267–68, 270–71 (1956); Insurance: Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 8 ANN. REV. 
POPULATION L. 188 (1981) (noting the laws in France); Other Laws Affecting Parents and 
Children, 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 176–77 (1983) (noting the laws in Germany). 
22. JOSÉ ANTONIO COBACHO GÓMEZ & JUAN JOSÉ INIESTA DELGADO, COMENTARIOS A 
LA LEY 14/2006, DE 26 MAYO, SOBRE TÉCNICAS DE REPRODUCCIÓN HUMANA ASISTIDA (2007); 
Anita Stuhmcke, The Criminal Act of Commercial Surrogacy in Australia: A Call for Review, 
18 J.L. MED. 601, 603 (2011). 
23. T.C. Anand Kumar, Advent of Medically Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
(MART) in India, in THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES (ART) 3, 
3-4 (Gautam Allahbadia & Rita Basuray eds., 2004); Siddhartha Chatterjee, Prof. Robert 
Edwards, Nobel Laureate in Medicine 2010—Tribute of an Indian with Joy and Sorrow, 4 AL 
AMEEN J. MED. SCI. 1, 1 (2011). 
24. BART FAUSER & PAUL DEVROEY, BABY-MAKING: WHAT THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TREATMENTS MEAN FOR FAMILIES AND SOCIETY 10-11 (2011); Une Histoire de Quarante Ans, 
LE MONDE, Jan. 20, 1996. 
25. Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Australian Inquiries Binder 
3 (1991). National Library and Archives Canada, RG 33-154, accession no. 1993-94/531, Box 
23, file no. 2500-3-2. The birth of multiples might not be considered a success today, given 
the widespread awareness of the threats to women’s and children’s health that arise in cases of 
multiple gestation. European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology Task Force on 
Ethics and Law, Ethical Issues Related to Multiple Pregnancies in Medically Assisted 
Reproduction, 18 HUM. REPROD. 1976, 1977 (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
732  RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:725 
 
 
1991, Australia had engaged in more governmental inquiries into assisted 
reproduction techniques than any other country per capita.26   
Britain established the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology in 1982, also known as the Warnock Committee, to study 
the social, ethical and legal ramifications of assisted reproduction.27 In its 
report, published in 1984, the Committee acknowledged that the anxiety and 
moral indignation triggered by debates about these matters complicated its 
task;28 however, it also found that no one was in favor of allowing 
innovations in infertility treatment to develop without limits.29 Although the 
committee believed existing law to be inadequate to the task of responding to 
these new technologies, it nonetheless warned against regulating too rapidly 
or too extensively given that scientific advancement and public opinion 
would likely change briskly.30 The Warnock Report made several important 
recommendations, including the need for a licensing agency to oversee the 
practice of ART, that were later supported by the government31 and adopted 
by Parliament in 1990.32 The Report was prescient in remarking that 
“[d]ifferent countries are at different stages in the development both of 
services and of a policy response. They have different cultural, moral and 
legal traditions, influencing the way in which a problem is tackled and the 
ways in which it might be resolved.”33    
The first French, Swedish, and Austrian IVF births occurred in 1982, and 
France’s consultative committee on the ethics of biosciences and health was 
created shortly thereafter, in 1983.34 After years of debate, in 1994 France 
                                                                                                                               
26. Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Australian Inquiries Binder 
3 (1991).  National Library and Archives Canada, RG 33-154, accession no. 1993-94/531, 
Box 23, file no. 2500-3-2.   
27. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Human Fertilisation and Embryology iv (1984) (U.K.). 
28. Id. at 1. 
29. Id. at 2.   
30. Id. at 7. 
31. Jacqueline A. Priest, Assisted Reproduction—Development in England, 37 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 535, 535 (1988).  
32. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990. Note that the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act, banning commercial surrogacy, antedated the HFEA, having been enacted 
in 1985. 12 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 326 (1985).  
33. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 6 (1984) (U.K.). 
34. Une Histoire de Quarante Ans, supra note 24. 
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promulgated its bioethics law, which was slated for reexamination in 199935 
and revised in 2011.36   
Victoria promulgated the first set of comprehensive laws regulating 
assisted reproduction techniques in 1984.37 This act, the Infertility (Medical 
Procedures) Act of 1984, gave only heterosexual couples access to in vitro 
fertilization and permitted reimbursing gamete donors only to the extent of 
their travel and medical expenses.38 The Act provided that intending parents 
and donors were entitled to non-identifying information about each other 
upon request, and that donors were entitled to non-identifying information 
about the children born from the use of their gametes.39 The Act declared 
surrogacy contracts to be void and attached criminal penalties to commercial 
surrogacy and advertising related to surrogacy.40  
By the late 1980s, a full-fledged policy discussion about the law and 
ethics of assisted reproduction was underway in many European countries. 
Norway passed a law in 1987 permitting only married couples to have access 
to in vitro fertilization and requiring that they use their own gametes.41 Spain 
and Sweden were next to pass comprehensive laws, both in 1988.42 Spain’s 
law permitted all known assisted reproductive techniques—save surrogacy— 
and did not restrict treatment to married couples. Although Sweden allowed 
artificial insemination by donor,43 its law on in vitro fertilization permitted 
only heterosexual couples to use their own gametes in any attempt at 
“fertilization outside the human body.”44 Legislation in other countries 
followed in rapid succession, including Germany (1991), Denmark (1992) 
and Austria (1992).45  Many, albeit not all, of these legislative efforts of the 
late 1980s fit, as Anita Stuhmcke has observed, a pattern of responding to 
                                                                                                                               
35. Id. 
36. Le Projet de Loi Bioéthique Adopté, LE MONDE, June 2, 2011. 
37. Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children and Child Welfare, 11 ANN. REV. 
POPULATION L. 129, 130 (1984). 
38. Appendices, 11 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 302, 443–59 (1984). 
39. Id. at 454. 
40. Id. at 458–59. 
41. Appendix, 14 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 241, 358 (1987). 
42. Sweden’s law came into force on January 1, 1989.  JENNIFER GUNNING & VERONICA 
ENGLISH, HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: A CASE STUDY IN THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL 
INNOVATION 164 (1993). 
43. Assisted Reproduction Fertility Regulation, 14 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 51, 55 
(1987). 
44. Assisted Reproduction Fertility Regulation, 15 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 52, 58 
(1988).  
45. GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 42, at 147, 151, 154. 
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biomedical developments “by initially applying the heavy-handed regulatory 
model of the criminal law and then subsequently [adopting] more nuanced 
and flexible regulatory frameworks.”46  
European legislation on ART generally fits within one of three 
classifications: (1) permissive; (2) cautious; and (3) prohibitive.47 Permissive 
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Spain exhibit tolerance toward 
most well-known forms of assisted reproduction except commercial 
surrogacy.48 These jurisdictions typically allow the use of third-party 
gametes and embryos and do not limit access to assisted reproductive 
technology based on marital status or sexual orientation. Research using 
supernumerary embryos, the cloning of embryos for stem cell research, and 
the selection of embryos with the aid of pre-implantation diagnosis is also 
permitted in liberal jurisdictions.49 Cautious jurisdictions such as France and 
Denmark do not have widespread restrictions but nonetheless have strict 
rules requiring anonymity in gamete donation50 and bans on surrogacy.51 
Cautious jurisdictions may allow pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(“PGD”) of embryos only in special cases and may prohibit the creation of 
embryos through in vitro fertilization or therapeutic cloning for research 
purposes.52 Cautious jurisdictions may, however, permit research on embryos 
that remain from couples who have completed their infertility treatment.53 In 
addition to these restrictions on practice, France permits only stable 
heterosexual couples to have access to assisted reproduction.54  
The prohibitive approach stands in contrast to the liberal approach by 
placing limits on embryo and stem cell research and embryo selection 
following PGD.55 Many assisted reproduction laws in Europe contain 
restrictions that impede some infertile couples and individuals from 
                                                                                                                               
46. Stuhmcke, supra note 22, at 605. 
47. See Nielsen, supra note 14, at 306. 
48. See generally H.W. Jones et al., IFFS Surveillance 2010, FERTILITY & STERILITY 
13–14 (2010). 
49. Frédéric Varone, Christine Rothmayr et al., Comparing Biotechnology Policy in 
Europe and North America: A Theoretical Framework, in THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
IN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE: POLICY NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
INTERNATIONALIZATION 1, 7, 9 (Eric Monpetit, Christine Rothmayr et al. eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY]. 
50. Jones et al., supra note 48, at 65. Israel is another country of this type. Id.  
51. Id. at 109–10. 
52. THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 9. 
53. Id. 
54. Jones et al., supra note 48, at 4. 
55. THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 9. 
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obtaining treatment in their home countries. The most common restrictions 
bar participation by third-party gamete donors and surrogates in the 
reproductive process, prohibit compensation of these third parties, or deny 
gamete donors any right to remain anonymous. Prohibitive countries such as 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy also outlaw techniques that are 
elsewhere embraced as mainstream procedures. In these jurisdictions, oocyte 
donation is banned outright.56 Austria and Italy also prohibit sperm donation 
in IVF.57 In addition to banning these forms of third-party gamete donation, 
Switzerland prohibits PGD.58 It is joined in this restriction by several non-
European countries including Chile, China, Ivory Coast, and the 
Philippines.59 Although it does not always require PGD, non-medical sex 
selection is banned in the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and Taiwan.60  
In general, restrictions on assisted reproduction aim to combat one or 
more of several evils believed to emerge from the laissez-faire approach to 
regulation: (1) the commodification of reproduction generally; (2) 
psychological harm to children; (3) health risks to egg donors; and (4) the 
danger to societal integrity posed by donor-created families. The restrictions 
themselves take several forms, whether barring participation by third-party 
gamete donors and surrogates in the reproductive process, prohibiting 
compensation of these third parties, or denying gamete donors any right to 
remain anonymous.   
Despite the prevalence of legislation in Europe, Nielsen’s classification 
scheme shows international disharmony. But even within individual 
countries, European observers point out the difficulty of achieving internal 
consensus on these questions that leads to complete coherence within any 
given legislative scheme. As was remarked early on in the history of the 
regulation of assisted reproduction in Europe, “[v]ery few countries achieve 
an internal consensus on all issues surrounding medically assisted 
conception, one that allows for a coherent and comprehensive national policy 
or legislation.”61 Thus, what some perceive to be a patchwork of restrictions 
across countries turns out to be a patchwork of restrictions within countries 
as well.  
                                                                                                                               
56. Jones et al., supra note 48, at 47–48.  
57. Id. at 46–48.  
58. Id. at 100. 
59. Id. at 101. 
60. Id. at 95–96. 
61. Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia Lebris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted 
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That European regulation of assisted reproduction is so varied can be 
understood first and foremost as the natural outgrowth of the broad 
competence of individual countries to regulate human reproduction and the 
differing religious and moral values with which they do so. It is especially 
important, then, to consider the therapeutic cultures that contribute so 
significantly to the look and feel of whatever regulation ultimately comes 
into force. I borrow this term from Arthur Daemmrich’s Pharmacopolitics, 
which defines a therapeutic culture in the field of drug regulation as the 
historical evolution of the often fraught relationships among of physicians, 
government regulators, the pharmaceutical industry and pressure groups that 
leads to particular regulation of pharmaceuticals.62 Daemmrich focuses on 
the United States and Germany, two capitalist states with similar 
technological advancement in, and governmental support for, medical 
technology. But the cultures of medical care delivery in these two countries 
differ sharply: in the United States it is a private good, in Germany a public 
entitlement. These understandings about appropriate medical care delivery 
are, of course, products of broader cultural beliefs and practices. 
Daemmrich’s goal in approaching the question of drug regulation in this 
fashion is to better understand the role of politics in medicine and, more 
particularly, the politicization of drug testing and drug science.63 From a 
wider perspective, delineating the therapeutic culture at work in any given 
instance “indicates how health-care provision practices are shaped by 
historical developments and interactions between different actors in the area 
of health care, which have led to nationally specific constellations of health-
care provision.”64  
                                                                                                                               
62. ARTHUR A. DAEMMRICH, PHARMACOPOLITIC: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND GERMANY, 4, 11 (2004). This use of the term is in contrast to its use in literature 
on emotional health. E.g., Elaine Swan, “You Make Me Feel Like A Woman”: Therapeutic 
Cultures and the Contagion of Femininity, 15 GEND. WORK & ORG. 88, 88 (2008) (defining 
therapeutic culture as “the congeries of practices, meanings and values connected by the belief 
that the psychological self, as opposed to the physical self, is the source of wellbeing.”); 
Lisbet Borge and May Solveig Fagermoen, Patients’ Core Experiences of Hospital 
Treatment: Wholeness and Self-Worth in Time and Space, 17 J. MENTAL HEALTH 193 (2008) 
(reflecting on the optimal therapeutic environment in which to treat mental illness). It is also 
in contrast to the work of social scientists writing on how a “therapeutic ethos” has pervaded 
American society. E.g., JONATHAN B. IMBER, THERAPEUTIC CULTURE: TRIUMPH AND DEFEAT 
(2004).  
63. DAEMMRICH, supra note 62, at 5. 
64. Erik Aarden et al., Providing Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in the United 
Kingdom: A Comparative In-depth Analysis of Health Care Access, 7 HUM. REPROD. 1542, 
1543 (2009).  
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Daemmrich’s generalizations about therapeutic cultures apply readily to 
other areas of medical policy. “Intense debates and very serious differences 
of opinion” are staples in policy debates on bioethical matters in particular, 
with each cultural constituent striving to establish itself as the most 
legitimate spokesperson or “obligatory ‘point of passage’” on questions of 
regulation.65 This state of affairs is discernible not only with respect to drug 
regulation but perhaps even more saliently in the regulation of assisted 
reproduction where there is little room to deny that religious, moral and 
cultural values play a prominent role in the formulation of policy.  
III.  THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S INFLUENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
  
The Roman Catholic Church is the dominant church in Latin countries 
around the world, recalling its founding at Rome and its inclusion in the 
colonial activities of the Romans and subsequently of the Spanish. Today, 
the religion is predominant in Southern Europe and Latin America. The 
Church claims 1.18 billion adherents66 with noticeable growth in Africa and 
Asia.67 Projections indicate that the power base of the Church, already on the 
wane in Europe in the wake of searing sex-abuse scandals, will reemerge in 
the more loyal southern hemisphere by mid-century.68 Given the Church’s 
predominance in many countries, it is more than capable of exerting an 
influence on legislative matters.  
The Church takes two positions that cause it to disapprove of abortion 
and assisted reproduction. First, it is committed to protecting human life 
from the point of conception.69 This means that it is morally opposed to 
abortion as a matter of principle, although it does not condemn abortion in 
cases of ectopic pregnancy. Second, a child must be the product of the sexual 
union of a married heterosexual couple. This means that the Church is 
                                                                                                                               
65. DAEMMRICH, supra note 62, at 11. 
66. Francis X. Rocca, Number of Catholics Worldwide Edges Up, Vatican Says, THE 
CHRISTIAN CENTURY (Feb. 22, 2011), http://christiancentury.org/article/2011-02/number-
catholics-worldwide-edged-vatican-says. 
67. Factfile: Roman Catholics Around the World, BRITISH BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION (Jan. 1, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4243727.stm. 
68. Philip Jenkins, The End of the European Church, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29, 
2010, available at http://www.npr.org/templates /story/story.php?storyId=126382767 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2011). 
69. Joseph G. Schenker, Assisted Reproductive Practice: Religious Perspectives, 10 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 310, 311 (2005). 
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opposed to methods of human conception that do not involve sexual 
intercourse, i.e., techniques of assisted reproduction.70  
Both views are rooted in the idea of a communion of persons. Human 
beings are made in God’s likeness to express love in “an all-encompassing 
self-surrender for the sake of others.”71 This idea exists throughout Catholic 
theology and is prominent in its tenets regarding the family and sexuality. 
The familial communion of persons, defined as a married heterosexual 
couple who choose each other forever, who engage in procreative sex only 
within such a union and welcome all resulting children into the family, is the 
most important communion of persons.72 Divorce, adultery, pre-marital sex, 
abortion, contraception and assisted reproduction all undermine the family as 
a community of persons.73 They are prohibited because they are acts of 
selfishness that conflict with the “total self-donation of one person to 
another” upon which the familial communion of persons is founded.74 
The Catholic Church considers the use of ART a serious abuse that 
destroys both love and life. ART is the product of a “contraceptive 
mentality” that destroys love by reducing sexual intercourse to “a merely 
biological function” and destroys life because it seeks to create children 
without sexual intercourse.75 By using ART, the couple is “manipulating and 
using their bodies” through a selfish desire for children.76 This is contrary to 
God’s will and an affront to human dignity.77 “The practice of artificial 
conception reduces procreation to a merely biological, laboratory act when it 
must be, by God’s will, the fruit of a covenant, a communion of persons, as 
expressed in the conjugal embrace of a man and a woman joined in 
marriage.”78   
The Church’s views on ART were published in the 1987 instruction 
Donum Vitae, which specifically condemns the cryopreservation of embryos, 
procreation outside of marriage, a married couple’s using donated gametes or 
                                                                                                                               
70. Id. at 311; Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s Rights The New 
Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 86 (2006). 
71. RICHARD M. HOGAN & JOHN M. LEVOIR, COVENANT OF LOVE: POPE JOHN PAUL II ON 
SEXUALITY, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY IN THE MODERN WORLD 37 (1985). 
72. Id. at 40. 
73. Id. at 43–45, 46, 48–56. 
74. Id. at 46, 60. 
75. Id. at 56. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. (emphasis added). 
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embryos to have children, and surrogacy.79 The instruction likewise 
condemns techniques of assisted reproduction that permit a married couple to 
contribute their own gametes and gestation to the process of creating a 
child.80 The act of sexual intercourse is said to be essential to responsible 
procreation.81  
Donum Vitae is a political document. In direct contrast to the Church’s 
stance in the early 1960s, when it sought “to distance itself from party 
politics (especially in Italy) and concentrate more fully on its universal 
spiritual and pastoral mission,”82 Donum Vitae urges legislatures to embrace 
its dictates as a blueprint for regulation. In particular, the instruction 
advocates provisions that vindicate the natural law concepts that lie behind 
its list of condemned practices. Not to do so would violate inalienable rights 
vested in each person by the Creator: the rights to life and integrity, the rights 
to family and marriage, but perhaps most importantly the right of each child 
to be created and raised by married heterosexual parents.83 As a response to 
advances in biomedicine, Donum Vitae urges adherence to the teaching of 
the Church as the only defense to humankind “against the excesses of [its] 
own power.”84 
A.  Spain 
Spain is a special case for the Catholic Church. Until the late 1960s, it 
was the most conservative of all the other major Catholic countries.85 But 
today, although 94.2 percent of the Spanish citizens are baptized Catholics,86 
the country is increasingly secular. Spain’s shift to democracy after the death 
of dictator Francisco Franco was accompanied by the increased separation of 
church and state. At present, and even though it is nominally represented by 
a strong opposition party, the Partido Popular, the Church simply has very 
little influence in the legislature. Interest in the Church among young people 
                                                                                                                               
79. Donum Vitae, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH—CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF 
THE FAITH, 10, 12, 13, available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/cdfhuman.htm 
[hereinafter Donum Vitae].  
80. Id. at 15–17. 
81. Id. at 14–15. 
82. CHRISTOPHER DUGGAN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF ITALY 266 (1994). 
83. Donum Vitae, supra note 79, at 19. 
84. Id. at 22. 
85. STANLEY G. PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME, 1936–1975 at 560 (1987) [hereinafter 
PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME]. 
86. The Largest Catholic Communities, http://www.adherents.com/largecom/com 
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in particular has plummeted fifty-six percent in the last ten years.87 In this 
connection, commentators note that it is no accident that the corporate-
backed World Youth Day 2011, one of the mechanisms by which the Church 
hoped to reinvigorate itself, was held in Madrid.88 The reported 60 million 
euro price tag for the event triggered a secular backlash.89   
Any attempted understanding of Spanish assisted reproduction policy 
cannot ignore the role of the Catholic Church in Spanish politics throughout 
the twentieth century. For centuries until the late twentieth century, the 
Spanish were “the most Catholic of peoples,”90 their identity inextricably 
conjoined with their faith.91 The Church’s fortunes had of course waxed and 
waned with divergent political tides but held on and indeed achieved 
stunning political prominence during the rule of Francisco Franco, the head 
of the longest totalitarian regime of the twentieth century. Before Franco, 
under the parliamentary system of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the church had lost political ground because of its alignment with 
the old-line elites.92 But under Primo de Rivera, the dictator who rose to 
power and brought fascism to Spain in the 1920s, upsurges of Spanish 
nationalism, embracing a historic Spanish ideology to expand Christendom 
and to restore traditional Spanish values, gave the Church renewed political 
legitimacy.93 “Religion, in fact, became the main single ideological force 
invoked to legitimize the new regime,” leading one prescient politician to 
lament that “‘the Church, ignoring all its traditions, placed itself at the 
service of force, against law and justice.’”94 In contrast to the Italian fascism 
of the same period, marked by its conflicts with the Church,95 Primo de 
Rivera dubbed his movement a Christian one,96 and it was warmly embraced 
                                                                                                                               
87. Stephen Burgen, Spanish Priests Join Opposition to Costly Papal Visit, THE 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/09/spain-
priest-oppose-pope-visit. 
88. Benedictus, PP. XVI, Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI for the Twenty-
Sixth World Youth Day (2011), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father 
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by many Catholics, particularly middle-class adherents of the faith who 
formerly had had little role in politics.97 Later, Francisco Franco would use 
his regime’s strong Catholic identity in an attempt to distinguish Spanish 
from Italian fascism.98  
To some, “the Primo de Rivera dictatorship . . . seemed to provide the 
final proof that the Church was in league with repression and reaction and 
therefore must be brought to its knees.”99 After Primo de Rivera’s resignation 
in 1930, rising anticlerical sentiment culminated in the worst persecution of 
the Catholic Church that had ever been seen in Western Europe.100 
Simultaneously, the Church was stripped of authority and support by the 
Republican government that succeeded Primo de Rivera.101 This violent 
persecution for a short while succeeded in curtailing the power of the 
Church,102 but outrage and fear soon galvanized a Catholic political party 
that eventually became the most redoubtable single political force in 
Spain.103 Indeed, during the ensuing Spanish Civil War between the 
Nationalists, led by Franco, and the Republicans, there was enthusiastic 
Catholic response to the cause of nationalism104 and horrific persecution of 
the Catholic establishment by their Republican opponents.105 “Catholic 
backing . . . became the most important single domestic pillar of the 
Nationalist movement.”106 Although loyalty to the Catholic church had not 
been overt at the beginning of the conflict, once the initial rebellion had 
erupted into a full-scale civil war, “the military leadership moved to take 
advantage of Catholic backing”107 by pledging and eventually fashioning a 
Catholic Spain that would require, among other things, the teaching of 
Catholic doctrine in schools, the installation of crucifixes in classrooms, the 
segregation of educational activities by gender,108 and, later, the abolition of 
divorce.109 Church leaders thereafter began to voice their support of the 
                                                                                                                               
97. PAYNE, FASCISM IN SPAIN, supra note 93, at 28–29. 
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Nationalist cause, some likening it to a religious crusade.110 Throughout the 
term of the war, the “absolute identification of the Nationalist cause with the 
church” became more and more fixed.111 Franco himself, raised a devout 
Catholic, believed firmly that Spain had a special religious mission and that 
faith and nationalism were inseparable.112 Indeed, during World War II, 
Franco declared Catholicism to be the primary reason Spain assumed a 
stance of complete neutrality: “‘Spain could never be joined to other 
governments that did not hold to Catholicism as first principle.’”113  
Interestingly, the Vatican did not rush to recognize the Nationalist 
government during the Spanish Civil War. But Spanish prelates, forming a 
united front, described the Civil War to the Holy See as an act of piety that 
had reestablished and reinvigorated Catholicism in a Spain that now wanted 
to cleave to the church after a period of profaning and destroying it.114 To do 
so, according to this narrative, would be consistent with a return to what had 
historically been Spain’s essential culture and ethos.115 Fascism in Spain 
would be absolutely and truly Catholic in a manner that fascism in Italy 
never desired to be. Over time, relations between Spain and the Vatican 
would warm considerably. 
Post-Civil War Spain was marked by repression within the country and 
ostracism from without. Along with “the broadest assortment of religious 
regulations seen in any twentieth-century western state,” regulations that 
blurred the distinction between religious and daily life, the church hierarchy 
became firmly intertwined with the workings of government and benefited 
from handsome public subsidies.116 The most important political objective of 
the new state was a concordat with the Vatican.117 Efforts to achieve this 
were delayed by World War II, but at war’s end Franco intensified efforts to 
burnish the Catholic image of his regime “in order to win the support of the 
Vatican.”118 Despite Spain’s general ostracism by world leaders in the post-
war period, the Vatican, though cautious, was pleased with the emergence of 
a strong Catholic culture in Spain, one in which religious observance became 
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embedded in social119 and political120 life to such an extent as to constitute a 
bona fide “national Catholicism.”121 The Church granted Spain the fullest 
possible recognition in 1953 in an agreement that expanded the 
independence of the church within Spain.122 It would not be long, however, 
before the first indications of dissent and secularization began to appear.123 
The rapid urbanization and economic prosperity brought about by the 
industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s “reoriented social psychology, 
which became attuned to the common consumerist and hedonist culture of 
the western world in the second half of the twentieth century.”124 This social 
and cultural shift accompanied by greater wealth and foreign cultural 
influences had a strong influence on Spaniards’ commitment to Catholicism:  
A highly urban, sophisticated, materialist, nominally educated, and 
hedonistic Spain, increasingly attuned to the secular and consumerist life of 
western Europe, simply ceased to be Catholic in the traditional manner. 
Though the majority of Spaniards did not reject their religious identity, they 
no longer identified with the traditional values and practices of the religion 
per se.125  
The lay populace was not the only constituent of the church affected by 
the upheaval. Given its prior conservatism, “the Church in Spain was one of 
the branches of Catholicism most profoundly affected by the cultural and 
religious crisis stemming from Vatican II” in 1965.126 A highly vocal revolt 
primarily among younger priests rocked the clergy127 with strident demands 
for governmental reform.128 These events stoked rightist anticlericalism 
against “Marxist” priests who had infiltrated the church with their subversive 
ideas129 but did not succeed in stamping out more and more widespread 
clerical calls for reform in the direction of democratic pluralism and more 
autonomy for itself.130 By 1973, two years before Franco’s death, the Church 
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was slipping inexorably out of the regime’s control. In his death message, 
Franco proclaimed, “‘I sought always to live and die as a Catholic.’”131 He 
went to his grave “the last great avatar of the traditional Spanish national-
Catholic ideology . . . . ”132 He had resisted liberalization and 
democratization to the end.133  
In the post-Franco years, the Church experienced a dramatic decline.134 
A long-awaited moment had been reached for embracing “liberal models of 
government as a reaction to the repressive Catholic conservatism of the 
Franco period.”135 The 1977 Constitution made explicit that Spain no longer 
had a state religion.136 In the 1977 parliamentary elections, the Church issued 
a statement entitled “Moral Responsibility of the Vote” calling upon 
Catholics “to assess carefully the program of the various parties in light of 
their ‘ideological or operative commitments’ which affect religious values or 
fundamental human rights.”137 The statement in part condemned the proposal 
of certain parties to legalize abortion. But the position of the Church as a 
political force to be reckoned with was weakened by the heterogeneity of 
political views within the Church itself. By the spring of 1979, “the Spanish 
population was sharply divided in terms of religiosity, feelings towards the 
Church, and opinions on the role of the Church in society.”138 Although the 
Spanish government did not reject the Church and in fact continued to 
sustain it in important ways,139 there has been “a liberal reaction against the 
spiritual formalism and social conformity of earlier times.”140 The Church in 
this more recent period has unsuccessfully opposed the legalization of 
divorce, abortion141 and same-sex marriage. 142 The Church’s stance on these 
issues has placed it in opposition to the government rather than in alignment 
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with it.143 Spain’s constitutional court recently stripped the Church of what 
had long been its right to fire teachers of religious education in state schools 
“who do not follow Catholic precepts in their relationships.”144 The 2010 
visit of the Pope to Spain was marked by, if not a chilly reception from the 
government, at least one that was noticeably lukewarm. President Zapatero 
did not attend the mass celebrated to consecrate the basilica of La Sagrada 
Familia in Barcelona and spent a mere five “cordial” minutes with the Pope 
in an airport hangar as the pontiff was preparing to embark on his return to 
Rome.145 The image was a powerful reminder that Spain, in stark contrast to 
the Franco years, is currently noticeably estranged from the Catholic Church.  
B.  Italy 
Like Spain and other European countries with totalitarian pasts, Italy 
today touts its commitment to democracy and pluralism. But underlying this 
public image is a long history of patriarchy and Catholicism that still has 
strong undercurrents on many different levels in contemporary Italian 
society.146 Saying Italy is a Catholic country really means that “Italian views 
of marriage, the family, and social justice, along with Italian cultural values 
and education, have remained very largely Catholic.”147  
The issue of the intertwinement of the Church with politics 
unquestionably has deeper roots,148 but it has been “a fact of daily life” since 
the founding of the Italian Republic in 1861.149 The new state was founded 
upon a commitment to the separation of church and state that rankled the 
Church and inspired it to withhold its recognition and to forbid the faithful 
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from holding public office or voting in national elections.150 The Church 
knew that the separation of church and state was likely to create a crisis of 
identity among the populace that could cause the new republic to founder.151 
In the words of Italian historian Alberto Acquarone: “Italy differed from all 
other European nation-states because the centuries-old special connection 
between Italian society and the Catholic church was bound to provoke a 
permanent, if only latent, crisis of identity in the most politically conscious 
Italians, an emotional strain that could even upset non-believers.”152 The non 
expedit was eventually lifted, allowing Catholics to vote in Italian elections 
for the first time in 1904.153  
As did Spain, Italy fell to fascism in the 1920s. Under Mussolini, the 
country pursued an imperialist agenda the strength of which was said to 
depend upon the will of women to become committed reproducers of the 
nation and increase the birth rate.154 A legal framework was constructed to 
advance these aims. Part of this framework was the criminalization of birth 
control and abortion, the bachelor tax and birth bonuses for large families.155 
The Church remained the only institution not fully fitted within the 
totalitarian state.156 Mussolini, sensing an opportunity to galvanize his power 
with Church support, paid a high price to enter into the Lateran Pacts which 
made the Vatican a sovereign city-state with the pope at its helm and granted 
the Church numerous desirable properties in exchange for its recognition of 
the Italian government and its relinquishment of its claim to its extensive 
former territorial holdings, the Papal States. The Pacts also established 
Catholicism as the official state religion157 and the right of the Church to 
control broad swaths of family life and religious instruction in public 
                                                                                                                               
150.  MARIO B. MIGNONE, ITALY TODAY: AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 255 (1998); HARRY HEARDER, ITALY: A SHORT HISTORY 203 (1990).  
151.  D.A. BINCHY, CHURCH AND STATE IN FASCIST ITALY 61 (1941) (noting that Pope 
Leo XIII hoped “that a complete boycott of the polling-booths by Catholic voters would 
undermine the already shaky foundations of [modern] Italy”).  
152.  Alberto Acquarone, A Closing Commentary: Problems of Democracy and the 
Quest for Identity, in MODERN ITALY: A TOPICAL HISTORY SINCE 1861 355, 359 (1974).  
153.  HEARDER, supra note 150, at 209. 
154.  HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 15–16; VICTORIA DE GRAZIA, HOW FASCISM RULED 
WOMEN: ITALY 1922-1945, at xi (1992) (“[T]he Duce’s regime fell back on the traditional 
authority of family and religion to enforce biologically determined roles as mother and 
caretakers.”). 
155.  HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 16. 
156.  BINCHY, supra note 151, at 684.  
157.  MIGNONE, supra note 150, at 255, 258. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011] RELIGION, FEMINISM AND ABORTION 747 
 
 
education. Handsome public subsidies, phased out nearly sixty years later,158 
rounded out the concessions made by the government to the Church.159  
Unlike in Spain, where democratic reforms occurred rapidly following 
the death of Franco, the dismantling of fascism in Italy around 1945 did not 
lead to any deep alteration in the sociopolitical terrain.160 The “patriarchal 
model of social relations” remained strong. The first Italian Constitution of 
1948 was very much infused by Roman Catholic natural law perspectives on 
responsible family relations; fascist-era laws on abortion and contraception 
remained in place. According to Patrick Hanafin, the “textual fantasy of 
pluralism” in the Constitution simply did not include women.161 What further 
exacerbated social division was the Church’s penchant for meddling in 
politics. The Constitution granted the Church privileges unlike any other 
democratic country,162 setting the stage for the Church to inject itself “into 
every aspect of civil life . . . . ”163 The Church attempted to control the 
political sphere during this period via an edict of excommunication against 
any Catholic who voted for a Communist or a Socialist, read or distributed 
communist literature or merely sympathized with those parties’ positions.164 
The political world was divided into saints and devils.165  
From 1948 until the mid-to-late-1960s, Catholics for the most part, with 
the encouragement of the Vatican, supported the Christian Democratic Party, 
ensuring the Church’s continued political influence.166 The party acted 
largely as an agent of the Church,167 stressing the sanctity of the family as 
against the claims of the State.168 After the death of Pius XII, the Church 
appeared to distance itself from politics as it grappled with concerns of a 
more spiritual and pastoral nature.169 As in most Western nations, the 1960s 
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and 1970s brought a period of increasing secularization to Italy, disaffection 
with the Christian Democrats who had for so long remained in power,170 and 
a steep falling off of church attendance and membership.171 Consistent with 
this change, in the late 1960s the Constitutional Court began to issue 
decisions that declared entrenched gender inequality in family relations and 
the workplace to be in violation of constitutional guarantees.172 As a part of 
this move toward more individual rights-based interpretations of the 
Constitution, the court nullified a notorious criminal adultery law that 
punished a wife’s adultery more severely than a husband’s.173 There were 
legislative developments as well, most notably the legalization of divorce in 
1970 and of abortion in 1978.174 Public referenda failed to nullify those laws 
in 1974 and 1981, respectively.175 Although some believe the election of the 
non-Italian pope, John Paul II, in 1978 signaled the determination of the 
Church to play a more restrained role in Italian affairs,176 in fact the Church’s 
influence continued to be felt in elections where the Church’s power was 
threatened.177 At such critical junctures, the Church called upon the faithful 
to “show their Catholicity,”178 but the tepid response, prompted in part by the 
view that the Church was merely a tool of the bourgeoisie,179 proved that the 
Catholic Church’s ascendancy over family matters had suffered a noticeable 
setback. By 1975 “a decisive majority of Italians had stated implicitly that 
religious doctrine was not to be the basis of the country’s laws or social 
life.”180  
By the 1990s, with legalized contraception and the rise of consumerism, 
Italy’s birthrate fell to the lowest in the world.181 Italy had for a long time 
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been gaining a reputation as a country that was on the cutting edge of 
reproductive science. It was a place where it was possible to acquire even 
unusual forms of assisted reproduction. Cases of postmenopausal mothers 
and even claims by one doctor that he had perfected and achieved human 
reproductive cloning stoked the outside world’s view of Italy as a place 
where anything was possible.182 There was support for some form of 
regulation going back to the birth of the first IVF baby in Italy in 1983, but 
the vast ideological divide between positions made any movement in the 
direction of legislation infeasible.183 Physicians groups and politicians were 
divided internally on the issue along secular-religious lines.184 Politicians in 
Italy have tended to avoid issues of bioethical controversy because of the 
fear of a conservative backlash and concomitant loss of political support. 
Thus, for many years, there was a lack of political will to proceed.185  
The Church’s “interference in Italian political life has become 
increasingly pervasive and forceful . . . . ”186 The Church has mobilized to 
create alliances with the government that constitute a theo-conservative 
backlash against what are perceived to be legislated threats to the traditional 
family.187 Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the Catholic Church has 
been managing its alliance with the government through its strategy of 
engaging directly in political action. It has been able through these efforts to 
tap into a religiosity that had gone dormant under the influence of an 
increasingly consumerist culture.188 At the same time, the government has 
found a useful ally with whom to trade favors. In short, the Church made a 
deal with the government that if it would pass a strict law on assisted 
reproduction then it could count on the Church’s backing on other issues.189  
In 2001, with the emergence of a stable coalition in Parliament, a 
government that had remained relatively agnostic about assisted reproduction 
finally became very interested in enacting restrictive legislation. Little 
Parliamentary opposition arose because the opposition party was comprised 
of many avowed Catholics. The leader of the opposition simply made the 
lackluster statement that the membership should be able to vote their 
                                                                                                                               
182.  HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 55.  
183.  Id. at 54.  
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. at 56.  
186.  Ungaro, supra note 148. 
187.  HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 25. 
188.  Id. at 54 (“The levels of religiosity remain comparatively high in Italy in relation 
to other European Catholic countries such as, for example, Ireland and Spain.”). See also id. at 
66, 80; DISCALA, supra note 172, at 313. 
189.  HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 60–61. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
750  RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:725 
 
 
consciences on such a volatile issue.190 The resulting legislation is 
breathtakingly restrictive. In addition to restricting access to stable 
heterosexual couples, the law also outlaws heterologous forms of assisted 
reproduction and prohibits pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and 
cryopreservation. Before the provision was questioned by the Constitutional 
Court, the law also forbade the creation of more than three embryos in any 
one IVF cycle and the insertion of all embryos created in the patient’s uterus.  
Inconsistencies in the Italian legislation reveal the lack of control that 
physicians had over the final legislation, in sharp contrast to the way Spain’s 
legislation was brought about. This lack of physician control can be seen in 
Article 6.3, which allows an individual’s consent to the procedure to be 
withdrawn only up to the point at which the egg is fertilized. According to 
Hanafin, “this leads to a bizarre result whereby the woman involved could 
potentially be forced to go through with the procedure once the egg is 
fertili[z]ed.”191 Post-enactment, scientists have criticized the law as anti-
scientific and detrimental to human rights.192 On the ground, clinicians began 
in earnest to report the effects that the law was having on outcomes. Some 
reported unfavorable outcomes, but other clinicians saw the issue differently, 
suggesting that the law had had a positive effect on spontaneous embryonic 
loss in single and multiple pregnancies.193 Doctors were also involved in the 
subsequent attempt to overturn the law by referendum.194 However, the 
Church’s call for a boycott of the polls was successful, and the legislation 
remained in place.195 To some, the failure of the referendum was not so much 
a product of Vatican meddling as it was the inability of the populace to 
identify with the problems of the infertile. Perhaps too, Italians were not only 
uninformed but apathetic, worn out by years of referenda that could not 
achieve a quorum. They were “drained of curiosity or civic responsibility. 
They simply couldn’t be bothered to inform themselves of what exactly was 
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at stake in this referendum.”196 Early constitutional challenges to the law also 
failed. The decisions seemed to be imbued by the spirit behind the original 
law, which was “the protection of ‘Life’ itself in the abstract.”197 In the 
words of Patrick Hanafin, the Italian embryo now occupies legal space.  
At this point in time, and in the current political climate, it seems highly 
unlikely that any sort of reform will emanate from the legislature in Italy. 
Instead, the fight over Italy’s assisted reproduction law has now moved to the 
courts. In early 2010, the Italian Constitutional Court struck down provisions 
in the Italian law mandating the production of at most three embryos in any 
one IVF cycle and requiring the immediate return of all embryos produced to 
the uterus. The primary objection of the court was that, in purporting to 
protect embryonic life, the law made no account of the medical fact that “it is 
impossible to procreate without a certain degree of early embryo loss.”198 A 
second objection was that the law rendered clinical judgment practically 
irrelevant in the treatment of patients despite the individualized 
circumstances of different patients. The Italian Constitutional Court was 
unwilling to defer to the legislature where a less intrusive approach—the 
resort to medical judgment—was available. In 2011, the European Court of 
Human Rights accepted a case brought to challenge the anti-PGD provisions 
of the Italian law as a violation of the right to private life and the anti-
discrimination provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.199      
Other aspects of the Italian law may also fail to satisfy the Convention. 
In outlawing all forms of heterologous reproduction, the legislature’s stated 
goal was to reaffirm the heterosexual couple as the only appropriate locus for 
family formation and to avert the dangers that attend the introduction of 
third-party gametes or embryos into the reproductive process, namely: (1) the 
threat to a couple’s relationship of having children not biologically related to 
both of them; (2) the psychological danger to a child who does not know the 
identity of and is not raised by both of his biological parents; and (3) injury 
to Italian society at large due to increases in marital breakdown and 
psychologically damaged children. But the prevalence with which Italian 
citizens, burdened by the restrictive law, seek assisted reproductive care in 
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other countries calls into question what harms Italy’s ban on heterologous 
reproduction is aimed at combating. Via cross-border reproductive travel, 
which admittedly cannot be outlawed if it takes place within the European 
Union, all of the feared dangers to patients, children, and society become 
subject to importation into Italy when patients return from abroad and give 
birth. Nonetheless, Italian legislators have not moved to enact provisions to 
combat these dangers or temper their ill effects. Despite the supposed 
importance of biological ties, the law itself makes clear that a gamete 
provider has no parental rights or obligations and that the commissioning 
couple is indisputably the child’s parents. Despite the fragility of family 
bonds that are thought to attend third-party gamete donation, the law 
contains no provision requiring the couple to adopt the child so as to solidify 
those bonds. It fails even to make a symbolic gesture in favor of the child’s 
right to know his biological parents. Absolutely no consequences whatsoever 
attend the use of third-party gametes abroad; indeed, life proceeds as normal 
upon the delivery of the child in Italy.  
Despite these anomalies, it seems probable that Italy’s prohibition on 
reproducing with donated gametes or embryos will remain in place.  The 
Constitutional Court was asked to consider the question after cases were 
brought to nullify the law in lower courts in Milan, Florence and Catania.200 
The court in Milan ruled that the law violates the right to form a family, 
including the right to have children.201 The Constitutional Court did not 
decide the question but remanded the cases to the respective lower courts to 
reconsider their decisions in light of S.H. v. Austria, a European Court of 
Human Rights decision upholding Austria’s restrictions on certain forms of 
heterologous reproduction.202 In S.H., the European Court determined that 
Austria was owed deference to legislate as it saw fit, given that moral and 
ethical responses to assisted reproduction are ever changing in an area so 
punctuated by fast-moving medical and scientific developments.203 The 
remand of the challenges to the ban on heterologous reproduction may be a 
signal that Italy’s constitution will not be a vigorous source of support, at 
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least in the near term, for Italians who require the participation of gamete and 
embryo donors in order to have children.  
IV.  THE ROAD TO REGULATION: PHYSICIANS, FEMINISM AND ABORTION 
Europe is the area of the world that presents the most disparities and 
contradictions in the fields of family planning and reproductive and sexual 
health.204 The most glaring discrepancies exist between Western and Eastern 
Europe:  
Family planning in Western Europe has been the story of the people against 
the authorities. In Central and Eastern Europe it has been the opposite. It has 
been the story of the government against the people. That essential difference 
still explains most of the discrepancies between the two parts of Europe.205 
 Within Western Europe, too, there are wide discrepancies, at least as 
regards the regulation of assisted reproduction. In the 1980s, infertile couples 
in Spain felt great shame about their inability to conceive. It was important to 
keep it a secret because of the general ignorance that kept infertility 
enshrouded in stigma. That the “cure” for infertility would entail decoupling 
reproduction from copulation inspired fear and controversy in many quarters 
rather than curiosity and rational thought. In the words of Marcelo Palacios, 
the “father” of the assisted reproduction law in Spain and currently President 
of the International Society of Bioethics, the advent of IVF forced Spain, a 
technologically backward country, to confront the future head on, and almost 
without warning.206 Pedro Barri, who along with Anna Veiga delivered the 
first IVF baby in Spain, remembers that the ensuing social debate revealed 
the general inability of the Spanish populace to comprehend that infertility 
was a problem that could be addressed through advancements in science. 
Indeed, reproductive technology was not considered science at all but some 
form of sorcery or witchcraft.207 Currently the director of the Stem Cell Bank 
and Chairman of the European Society of Reproductive Medicine, Veiga has 
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a similar recollection. People in general had no capacity to understand the 
science, and this led them to jump to emotional conclusions that were at 
times incompatible. People would vacillate between a reactive desire to 
protect embryos and their heartfelt view that infertile people should have 
access to a miraculous new science.208 There was very little consistency or 
lucidity in the public debate. The general ignorance, even though it was 
fertile ground for fearful reactions and contributed to the volatility of the 
issue, made it easier for those with superior knowledge to obtain the 
permissive law they desired.209 Spain stands in contrast, then, to many 
countries where the climate of fear that has arisen in response to new 
reproductive technologies has led to legal restrictions on techniques and 
access. 
In order to ensure progress and the expansion of scientific research, 
physicians took the lead in defining the terms of the debate in Spain.210 
Unlike medical groups in Italy, which were unable to present a unified stance 
on assisted reproduction,211 the medical sector in Spain banded together in 
favor of scientific progress.  
 The agenda of infertility physicians in Spain was first to convince the 
public that infertility is a disease. The hope was that steering the public’s 
understanding toward this view would lead to social acceptance of the 
medical techniques that had been developed and that would be developed in 
the future to address the problem.  “Our goal,” writes Veiga in her book The 
Miracle of Life, “was to provide the necessary information so that the public 
would understand what we were really doing.”212 Part of the campaign 
involved using media channels as educational tools. Physicians’ second 
important effort was in the direction of regulation. Unlike in the United 
States, where physicians tend to dislike and oppose regulation, in Spain, 
“[w]e realized we needed regulation because even though we could not 
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foresee everything that would happen, we knew something had changed with 
respect to reproduction.”213 In particular, physicians saw how their 
colleagues abroad had no shield against legal conflicts that had already 
occurred and were bound to occur with more frequency if a preemptive legal 
framework was not formally established. Thus, infertility physicians in Spain 
were eager to align themselves with politicians who were examining the 
issue around 1986. Barri and three other physicians accepted an invitation 
from Marcelo Palacios to address the congressional commission that had 
been created to examine the issue. Committee members looked to these 
physicians for information on the medical aspects of assisted reproduction.  
Palacios and others recall that the feminist opposition to a permissive 
law regulating assisted reproduction was weak. There was initially an outcry 
and some demonstrations, but, as Veiga recollects, feminists did not present 
a unified front, unlike the feminists in Italy who, in the 1970s, had been able 
to establish an impressive power base in an era that saw the dismantling of 
proscriptions on abortion, contraception, and divorce.214 Instead, some were 
in favor of assisted reproduction and some were against it. But neither group 
was thinking in much detail about the techniques or in a sufficiently serious 
manner about them. The dichotomy within feminist perspectives on assisted 
reproduction was also evident at the time Italy was debating placing 
restrictions on assisted reproduction. The mass feminist movement of the 
1970s had broken apart, and its stance on assisted reproductive technologies 
was not uniform.215 After the Spanish law on assisted reproduction was 
enacted, Matorras perceived the feminist movement to be more univocal. He 
recalls that Spanish feminists did not like the law initially because they saw 
IVF as a technique created by males for the purpose of experimenting on 
women’s bodies. Later, however, they began to defend IVF, because the law 
in Spain allows single women to give birth to and rear children with a 
minimum of male interference.216 Matorras is probably referring to the 
radical feminist perspective when he remembers the early opposition to the 
law. Feminist responses to reproductive technology are varied and have 
broken down largely along the lines of radical and liberal perspectives. 
Radical feminists note that, despite the high incidence of male infertility 
                                                                                                                               
213.  Interview with Anna Veiga, Director, Stem Cell Bank, Center of Regenerative 
Medicine of Barcelona; Chairman, European Society of Human Reproduction and 
Embryology (Nov. 15, 2010). 
214.  HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 27.  
215.  Id. at 53–54.  
216.  Interview with Roberto Matorras, Director, Human Reproduction Unit, Hospital 
de Cruces (Nov. 11, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
756  RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:725 
 
 
worldwide, infertility is invariably cast as a female problem.217 Institutional 
ignorance about the environmental causes of infertility and a myopic focus 
on women's reproductive capacity to the detriment of other health issues of 
concern to women become entrenched.218 Consequently, to satisfy the 
masculine insistence on having a biological connection to offspring, the 
bodies both of infertile women and of those who are paired with infertile 
men become subject to a host of medical interventions, including not only 
invasive in vitro fertilization but also experimentation that is of little benefit 
to them.219 The general hostility some feminist adherents bear toward 
reproductive technology arises from the view “that women’s choice to 
participate in infertility treatments is so conditioned by the socially 
constructed stigma of infertility and a socially imposed norm of maternity as 
to be no real ‘choice’ at all.”220 By contrast, liberal feminists believe that 
reproductive technology enhances the role of choice in procreative decision-
making. Through this lens, even assisted reproductive arrangements 
involving surrogate motherhood appear unproblematic, at least if measures 
are taken to ensure full and fair disclosure and to safeguard against 
overreaching.221   
A unifying feature of both the radical and the liberal perspectives is their 
common commitment to opposing discrimination. Both radical and liberal 
feminists fear that the reproductive technology industry may attempt to 
channel people in the direction of “responsible” procreation and thereby 
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perpetrate discrimination against single mothers, gays and lesbians, the poor, 
and others deemed undeserving of parenthood.222 On this issue, feminists 
transcend the labels “radical” and “liberal” to express a common concern 
about the perpetuation of inequality and exploitation by powerful 
institutions.   
On another front, Veiga recalls that there was some opposition to the law 
from anti-abortionists. In Italy and Spain, abortion, disallowed for most of 
the twentieth century, became the subject of intense debate in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. In Italy, “the attack on the abortion law was led by the 
women’s liberation movement.”223 The final act passed in 1978 “allowed 
abortion on request during the first ninety days of pregnancy at the expense 
of the state.”224 In Spain, under Franco, abortion, birth control and divorce 
were illegal, and women found guilty of adultery could be sent to prison for 
up to six years.225 After the death of Franco, birth control and divorce were 
legalized and adultery eliminated as a criminal offense.226 The abortion 
prohibition remained the law until 1985, when a “grounds-system model” 
was enacted to permit abortion where the women’s physical or mental health 
was at risk (at any time during the pregnancy), where the pregnancy was the 
result of rape and the rape has first been reported to the police (up to twelve 
weeks), and in cases of fetal impairment (up to twenty-two weeks).227 This 
law was changed in 2010 in a shift to a “time-system.” Now, abortion in 
Spain tends to be more of a medical question than a religious or political one. 
Even minors (up to 17) can choose to have an abortion in consultation with 
their physicians, without the consent of their parents, although they must 
show that at least one of their parents has been informed.228 In contrast, 
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assisted reproduction can be freely elected by minors of at least 16 years of 
age.229   
As a general matter, the Catholic Church believes that permissive views 
toward assisted reproduction extend from an “abortion-mentality.”230 
Abortion and assisted reproduction are intertwined, because abortion 
“deprives a category of human beings of the protection which civil 
legislation must accord them,” thus undermining the principle of equal 
treatment, and legalizing techniques of assisted reproduction exposes the 
resulting children to this same risk. Legalization threatens “the very 
foundations of a state based on law.”231 This view that assisted reproduction 
risks undermining the very fabric of civil society is a common theme 
throughout Donum Vitae,232 but was not effective in undermining support for 
a liberal law in Spain. Veiga remembers that in her debate with anti-
abortionists, they came across as uninformed and confused about the 
distinctions between abortion and assisted reproductive technology.  In sharp 
contrast to Italy, where “the Church drove the design and implementation of 
[assisted reproduction] legislation on its terms,”233 the Catholic Church’s 
opposition in Spain was weak and ineffective in gaining the ear of the 
committee studying the issue. 
Feminist and anti-abortion opposition to assisted reproduction might 
have been more forcefully voiced at the time of the enactment of the Spanish 
provisions, but if so, it was inaudible. At a later stage of the legislative 
process, the Partido Popular, the party most in alignment with Catholic 
perspectives, was headed by a single woman, María Dolores de Cospedal, 
who became a single mother with the aid of IVF. Some constituents submit 
that de Cospedal’s and other party members’ use of IVF renders them 
insufficiently Catholic to be authentically against abortion.234 Although this 
point of view too cavalierly assumes that those who employ assisted 
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reproduction necessarily are in favor of a liberal abortion policy,235 it 
nonetheless points out that conservative views about assisted reproduction 
are unlikely to have any effect on Spain’s liberal law even now that the 
Partido Popular has wrestled power from the Socialists236 who controlled the 
legislature at the time the law was passed.   
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
In contrast to Italy and Spain and other countries in Europe, with their 
comprehensive legislative regimes governing assisted reproduction, the 
United States is largely devoid of governmental regulation of this 
controversial area of medicine,237 leaving the medical profession to police 
itself even with respect to the minimal federally mandated reporting 
requirements that do exist.238 The American Society of Reproductive 
Medicine (ASRM) and its affiliate the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (SART), the dominant professional societies in this area of 
medical practice, have developed a voluntary accreditation program that 
requires clinics to adhere to its guidelines and practices standards.239 There 
are no legal consequences for clinics that elect not to pursue accreditation 
under this program.240 This state of affairs appears to be firmly entrenched, 
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given that at the federal level there is virtually no debate about regulating 
assisted reproduction,241 and at the state level we find only a patchwork of 
disconnected provisions covering discrete aspects of reproductive 
technology.242 
What accounts for this longstanding legal vacuum is a matter of some 
speculation. One theory for the absence of federal legislation is that 
reproductive technology lies outside the purview of what Congress may 
regulate.243 Another is that no consensus exists at the national level on what 
form the regulation should assume.244 At the state level, where we would 
expect regulation of the medical profession to originate, self-regulation of the 
infertility industry is also the prevailing norm. One possible roadblock to 
regulation is the battle over abortion that continues to rage in the United 
States in ways that seem incomprehensible in Europe. Since the regulation of 
assisted reproduction invariably brings up questions of the status of the 
embryo,245 politicians are loathe to become involved with this issue for fear 
of alienating certain constituencies.246 Even in states where anti-abortion 
sentiments are strong, it is possible that assisted reproduction, a technology 
aimed at helping people have children, is so bound up with notions of 
reproductive freedom and privacy that many would be uncomfortable asking 
the government to dictate how it can and cannot be used.247  
Despite the hesitancy of politicians to advance legislation in this area, the 
regulation of assisted reproduction is a popular wedge issue employed by 
those opposed to abortion who have less interest in reproductive technology 
per se than they have in advancing the position that embryos should be 
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regarded as human beings.248 Wedge-issue politics using ART regulation as a 
cover has met with some success in the area of embryo disposition (called 
“adoption” in this context) and embryonic stem cell research. New attempts 
are being made to advance an anti-abortion agenda through the issues of sex 
selection, the safety of egg donors, and the well-being of donor-conceived 
children.249 These efforts will not lead to anything resembling comprehensive 
legislation but, assuming success, will only exacerbate the problem of 
idiosyncratic and inconsistent legislation at the state level.  
In addition to the political fallout that might attend an attempt to regulate 
assisted reproductive techniques is the fact that the infertility industry itself 
disfavors governmental regulation of its activities.250 This may be a valid 
fear, given the example of Italy, whose regulation has wreaked havoc on the 
ability of infertility physicians to help their patients and was partially struck 
down for its micromanagement of the physician-patient relationship.251 The 
Italian Constitutional Court objected that the law rendered clinical judgment 
practically irrelevant in the treatment of patients despite the individualized 
circumstances different patients invariably present. The situation in the 
United States, though, is hardly akin to pre-2004 Italy, at least politically 
speaking. It is true that women’s groups are no more unified here than they 
were in Italy,252 but the prevailing religious winds in the United States, 
unlike those in Catholic Italy, are Protestant. While the influence of the 
Roman Catholic Church has inculcated in many Europeans the belief in 
“unconditional human dignity,” the Protestant ethic of the United States 
emphasizes individual responsibility.253 This attitudinal disparity may 
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explain to some degree why Protestants, some strands of which are 
admittedly vehemently opposed to abortion, are not as a group opposed to 
assisted reproduction.254 No Donum Vitae or analogous document exhorts 
members of any Protestant denomination to refrain from resorting to medical 
science for the purposes of procreation. Although there have been attempts in 
some state legislatures to bar certain classes of people from having access to 
assisted reproduction, there has to date been no concerted effort, as was the 
case in Italy, to ban certain techniques altogether.  
If there is any future movement toward a comprehensive legislative 
scheme governing ART in the United States, doctors will likely be the 
primary movers of policy as they were in Spain. As Varone et al. observe, 
the medical profession is organized and has a vested interest in policy 
development and so, armed as they are with specialized knowledge, are the 
first group of actors to whom the state will turn to ask for participation in the 
development of biotechnology policies or “are likely to be the first to turn to 
state actors to demand such policies.”255 In some cases, the medical 
profession may advance “self-regulation as a strategy of influencing and 
possibly preventing future state intervention.”256 Thereafter ensconced as 
“‘private interest governments,’” the medical profession may be “powerful 
enough to resist any policy change demanded by emerging groups” such as 
patients, the church, and women.257 Indeed, such emerging groups, 
specifically because they lack specialized technical knowledge “will often 
suffer from insufficient credibility to encourage policy change.”258 
With the abortion wars raging and an infertility industry content to 
operate free of any governmental regulation, legislative regulation of the 
infertility industry, at least in the United States, remains little more than an 
academic topic of conversation and will likely remain one well into the 
future. If anything, the United States will see nothing more than issue-
specific legal regulation of assisted reproduction.259 In this way, it will 
continue to be an outlier among nations that also have highly developed 
infertility industries.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The story of the legal regulation of assisted reproduction in Spain and 
Italy is the story of which interest group—the medical community, the 
Roman Catholic Church, or feminists—most effectively influenced 
legislators. Physicians in Spain in the early 1980s desired that Spain embrace 
assisted reproductive technology and join a group of countries committed to 
scientific advancement. This commitment to being at the forefront of 
scientific achievement resulted in a permissive law that would have been 
impossible to achieve just a little over ten years earlier in Franco-controlled 
Spain, even if IVF technology had been possible at that time. Feminist 
groups and the Church were impotent to challenge this dominant discourse 
because either, in the case of feminists, they assumed uninformed and 
contradictory stances toward the technology, or, in the case of the Church, 
were marginalized by a political system with too vivid a memory of the close 
connection with Franco the Church had pursued and exploited during the 
long decades of authoritarian rule.    
In Italy, the influence of physicians and the Church took a divergent 
course. Just as in post-Franco Spain, the Catholic Church’s influence over 
law and policy had waned during the turbulent 1970s and 1980s when social 
changes in many forms had swept across Italy. But in contrast to Spain, the 
fractured political party system and differences of opinion among physicians 
and feminists about the proper regulatory course meant that years would be 
spent in a legal vacuum that encouraged Italy to become a venue for any and 
all forms of assisted reproduction. Once a more united government entered 
power and the opposition refused to take a stand against restrictions on 
reproduction, the stage was set for the reemergence of the Church as a potent 
political force. Although the Church stopped short of suggesting that the 
tenets of Donum Vitae should become the law of the land, it was powerful 
and influential enough to persuade the government to enact the most 
restrictive set of regulations on assisted reproduction ever seen in Europe.  
Neither the Spanish nor the Italian approach to assisted reproduction is 
likely to change anytime soon. Constitutional challenges to the Spanish law 
failed in the 1990s, and although Italy’s Constitutional Court struck down the 
limitation on the number of embryos that could be created in any one IVF 
cycle, it does not follow that it will rule that the prohibition on egg, sperm 
and embryo donation is unconstitutional on either equality or liberty grounds. 
Indeed, the Court was emboldened by S.H. v. Austria simply to remand cases 
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to lower courts that had declared the prohibition unconstitutional.260 This 
may suggest that the European Court of Human Rights, which decided S.H., 
will prefer to remain deferential to the positions national legislatures adopt 
on assisted reproduction. However, the Court has declared admissible a case 
brought to challenge the anti-PGD provisions of the Italian law as a violation 
of the right to private life and the anti-discrimination provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.261  
A critical lesson to be drawn from this examination of the regulation of 
assisted reproduction in two Catholic countries is that those who introduce 
legislation and maintain control of the narrative are likely to see their 
positions become law. Once legislation is enacted, it tends to be difficult to 
repeal or alter in the absence of some dramatic change in attitudes or 
opinions. This leaves those who disagree with the state of the law on ART 
with little hope of dismantling those legislative regimes in the short term.  
A country like the United States, with virtually no regulation, might 
appear to be fertile ground for a group hoping to influence the direction of 
ART policy. In fact, however, the kind of process that led to legislation in 
Spain and Italy, where a dominant group with a consistent message 
controlled the legislative process from introduction to enactment, has already 
occurred in the United States. Unlike in Spain and Italy, where the 
controlling group desired legislation, however, the American infertility 
industry is opposed. That is why, in the final analysis, the state of regulation 
in the United States has much more in common with Spain than it does with 
Italy. For better or worse, physicians have already set and will continue to set 
the policy that prevails in the United States today.  
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